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Does Public Support Help Democracy Survive?
Abstract
It is widely believed that democracy requires public support to survive. The empirical evi-
dence for this hypothesis is weak, however, with existing tests resting on small cross-sectional
samples and producing contradictory results. The underlying problem is that survey measures
of support for democracy are fragmented across time, space, and different survey questions. In
response, this article uses a Bayesian latent variable model to estimate a smooth country-year
panel of democratic support for 135 countries and up to 29 years. The article then demonstrates
a positive effect of support on subsequent democratic change, while adjusting for the possible
confounding effects of prior levels of democracy and unobservable time-invariant factors. Sup-
port is, moreover, more robustly linked with the endurance of democracy than its emergence
in the first place. As Lipset and Easton hypothesized over 50 years ago, public support does
indeed help democracy survive.
Keywords: democracy, democratization, support for democracy, public opinion
Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analy-
ses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the
Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HWLW0J.
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Introduction
Democracy, once hegemonic on the world stage, is increasingly beleaguered. Democratic norms
and institutions have visibly eroded in major democracies such as the United States, India, and
Brazil (V-Dem Institute 2018b). Authoritarian-populist political movements have entered govern-
ment in 11 European countries.1 Ten democracies have failed since 2006 (Mechkova, Lührmann,
and Lindberg 2017).
A prominent explanation for these ails is the “fading allure” of liberal democracy (Plattner
2017; see also Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017; Wilke and Fetterolf 2018). Indeed, a long tradition of
political thought, extending back to Plato, holds that the vitality of democratic systems rests upon
the attitudes and beliefs of the citizenry. Contemporary political scientists have elaborated this
theory somewhat but agree with its basic contours: with public support, democracy is legitimate
and stable; without such support, democracy is insecure and likely to fail should a crisis of some
sort arise (e.g., Booth and Seligson 2009; Diamond 1999; Easton 1965; Lipset 1959; Mattes and
Bratton 2007; Norris 2011; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998).
Although this theory has been widely accepted by political scientists, it has received lit-
tle rigorous empirical confirmation. The few existing tests (Fails and Pierce 2010; Hadenius and
Teorell 2005; Inglehart 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Qi and Shin 2011; Welzel 2007) come
to contradictory conclusions. These studies, moreover, all utilize small datasets of a few dozen
countries observed at only one point in time. Yet without temporal variation it is very difficult
to model dynamic processes like the trajectories of public support and democratization. Cross-
sectional designs additionally cannot account for unobservable country-specific confounds, such
as the historical “critical junctures” which might co-determine paths of democratization and the
development of a democratic political culture (Jamal and Kensicki 2016). The widespread accep-




tance of the theory of democratic support thus rests on fairly flimsy evidence.
This article therefore returns to the question of whether public support helps democracy
to survive, offering two major advances over existing research. First, while existing studies use
a fraction of the available survey data on support for democracy, I use all the data that has been
collected by cross-national public opinion projects: 3,765 national opinions about democracy, ob-
tained from 1,390 nationally-representative public opinion surveys, gathered by 14 survey projects,
in 150 countries, over a period of 30 years. Because these data are heavily fragmented across time,
country, and disparate survey items, a dynamic Bayesian latent variable model (Claassen 2019) is
used to combine the shards of public opinion into one smooth measure of support for democracy.
This panel dataset of democratic support affords a second advance over existing tests: with varia-
tion over time and country, it is possible to adjust both for the effects of unobserved country-specific
confounds and for the influence of previous levels of democracy on current levels of support.
The analysis of this panel dataset shows that support for democracy is significantly and
positively associated with subsequent change in democracy. Support is, moreover, more robustly
linked with the endurance of democracy once it has been established, than with the emergence of
democracy in the first place. In other words, as Lipset and Easton hypothesized over 50 years ago,
public support does indeed help democracy survive.
Public Support and Democracy
The Theory of Democratic Support
The notion that democracy is rooted in the attitudes and orientations of the public has had an
enduring appeal. Plato, for example, worried that democracy was prone to failure because the
citizenry was unlikely to have the foresight or the inclination to hold leaders accountable. Many
centuries later, at the dawn of modern political science, Lipset (1959) returned to this topic in a
seminal paper. He argued that “political legitimacy” – the “belief that existing political institutions
are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” – is one of the principal “requisites” of
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stable democracy (Lipset 1959, 83).
This theory was extended and amplified by Easton (1965; 1975) in another classic contribu-
tion. Easton distinguished between three “objects” that citizens might support. The most abstract
of these objects is the nation or political community; the most concrete, the government and other
political actors. Of interest here is Easton’s intermediate object of support: the regime, or the basic
rules and principles by which authority is wielded in a state.
Public support for the regime – i.e., public support for democracy – may then be diffuse
or specific.2 Specific support for democracy focuses on regime outputs and consequently has an
instrumental quality, while diffuse support focuses on the principles of the regime and is therefore
normative. Diffuse support is also more durable than specific support, helping to cushion regimes
when political or economic crises strike. The concept of diffuse support for the regime thus closely
resembles Lipset’s notion of political legitimacy, but embeds the concept within a broader frame-
work of public support.
This Lipset-Easton theory of democratic support offers a clear and compelling account of
the link between the mass public and the dynamics of the political regime.3 It argues that principled
2There is some disagreement regarding the conceptualization of diffuse and specific support.
Some authors argue that support for particular political actors is necessarily specific, with support
for the regime or nation being diffuse (e.g., Norris 2011); others argue that any of the three objects
may be supported in a specific or diffuse fashion (e.g., Dalton 2004). What matters for the present
discussion is that there is general agreement that principled, diffuse support for democracy is more
likely to sustain democracy than instrumental, specific support.
3Inglehart and Welzel (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013) offer an alternative concep-
tualization of democratic political culture emphasizing citizens’ cultural values – such as liberty
aspirations, toleration of difference, and trust in others – rather than their overt attitudes to demo-
cratic versus nondemocratic regimes. As such, instead of requiring explicit support for democracy,
Inglehart and Welzel argue that democracy requires implicit support. This implicit conceptual-
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support for democracy helps ensure the survival of the regime. With such support, a democracy is
legitimate and stable. Without it, democracy is unstable and liable to fail (Easton 1965; Mishler
and Rose 1999).
Existing Tests of the Theory
Although the theory of democratic support has been widely accepted by political scientists (e.g.,
Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Booth and Seligson 2009; Diamond 1999; Gibson 1996;
Mattes and Bratton 2007; Norris 2011; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998), it has received very little
empirical attention. Most likely this is because the data which are required are far harder to obtain
than the demographic or economic indices used to measure other determinants of democracy. An
empirical test requires national measures of support for democracy, which, in turn, requires a
costly, nationally-representative public opinion survey for each data point. Indeed, it was not until
the groundbreaking inclusion of items measuring support for democracy on the third wave of the
World Values Survey (WVS) that the relationship between support and democracy could even be
empirically described.
In the first analysis of this data, Inglehart (2003) finds support to be modestly and posi-
tively correlated with democracy in a cross-sectional sample of 77 countries. Subsequent studies
largely examine the same WVS data. Inglehart and Welzel (2005), for example, use a subsequent
measure of democracy and control for years under democracy, but still find the same positive as-
sociation between democratic support and democracy. In contrast, Hadenius and Teorell (2005)
and Welzel (2007) show that support has little to no relationship with subsequent democracy once
one adjusts for the the initial level of democracy, which they regard as necessary to counteract the
possibility that democracy shapes political culture, rather than the reverse. Fails and Pierce (2010)
add data from the Global Barometer projects and control for additional variables, but find no evi-
dence that support is associated with either democratization or democratic survival. Finally, Qi and
ization of support is sufficiently distinct from the explicit that I do not consider it further in this
paper.
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Shin (2011) show that the level of public support for democracy is not associated with subsequent
democracy when controlling for prior democracy and other covariates, but the level of “critical
support” – the proportion of the public who both support democracy but are dissatisfied with its
performance – is.
These studies reach markedly different findings, despite largely being re-analyses of the
same WVS dataset. They also all use cross-sectional designs, which face two major limitations for
testing the effects of support on democratic change. First, democratic systems inculcate support
in their publics (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Mishler and Rose 2007; Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer
1998), which implies that support is likely influenced by previous levels of democracy (Hadenius
and Teorell 2005; Mattes and Bratton 2007; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017). However, cross-
sectional designs do not allow analysts to identify the effect of an independent variable when this
variable is in part determined by previous realizations of the dependent variable.
Second, both democracy and support are likely shaped by idiosyncratic country-specific
factors. Indeed, studies of democratization recognize the importance of key historical moments, or
“critical junctures,” which determined the paths by which both democracy and its purported deter-
minants developed in particular countries (Acemoglu et al. 2008; Jamal and Kensicki 2016). For
example, a country’s colonial experience may have influenced its trajectory of democratization and
also shaped its political culture (e.g., Diamond, Lipset, and Linz 1987; Rueschemeyer, Stephens,
and Stephens 1992). It is not possible to adjust for such unobserved country-specific confounds
using a cross-sectional research design.
Existing tests of the theory of democratic support are further limited by their reliance on
a small fraction of the available opinion data, with small cross-sectional datasets of between 41
(Hadenius and Teorell 2005) and 86 countries (Fails and Pierce 2010). Yet with numerous cross-
national survey projects now measuring support for democracy, there are are potentially thousands
of observations to be gathered across countries and years. In addition, extant tests assume that sup-
port for democracy items are comparable across countries although research has demonstrated that
survey questions have different meanings in different countries (Stegmueller 2011). Finally, these
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studies rely on the Freedom House index to measure democracy, which has received criticism for
its measurement error, clustering of cases at the extremes of the scale, and methods of scoring and
aggregating items (Alexander and Welzel 2011; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Pemstein, Meserve,
and Melton 2010). A more valid and reliable measure of liberal democracy is now available from
the Varieties of Democracy project.
In sum, existing studies that test the theory of democratic support come to contradictory
conclusions despite essentially analyzing the same dataset. These studies are moreover hampered
by cross-sectional designs, small samples, and other limitations which undermine their ability to
provide a dispositive test of the theory of democratic support. This is the task of this article.
Hypotheses
The theory of democratic support suggests a number of testable hypotheses, which are outlined
and explicated in this section.
First, following existing studies (Hadenius and Teorell 2005; Inglehart 2003; Inglehart and
Welzel 2005; Qi and Shin 2011; Welzel 2007), this article tests a general hypothesis that public
support for democracy shapes subsequent changes in democracy, either by promoting democra-
tization, or by preventing democratic backsliding. It assumes that the effect of support does not
manifest immediately; an increase in support, in other words, is expected to produce pressure for
future democratic change. The first hypothesis, H1, is as follows: Public support for democracy
is positively associated with subsequent change in democracy.
Lipset’s (1959) classic expression of the theory of democratic legitimacy focused on demo-
cratic systems, i.e., that support (or legitimacy) stabilizes and secures democracy when it already
exists. Other analyses of democratization have similarly recognized that the factors which allow
democracy to emerge may differ from those which help it to be sustained (e.g., Boix 2011; Fails
and Pierce 2010; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Teorell 2010). This
article follows suit, with the second and third hypotheses focusing on the role played by support in
either the survival or the emergence of democracy.
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The second hypothesis, H2, pertains to the effect of support contingent on the existing level
of democracy: public support for democracy in already-existing democracies is positively as-
sociated with subsequent change in democracy. In other words, support influences subsequent
change in democracy only to the extent that some level of democracy already exists. When it does,
change may then occur in either direction, with both increases and decreases in democracy possi-
ble. According to this hypothesis, support helps democracy to survive. A similar hypothesis has
been proposed and tested by Acemoglu et al. (2009) with respect to development and democracy.
The final hypothesis focuses instead on the effects of support in autocratic systems. Al-
though it has received less attention that the “supportive” role of support, a few scholars have
proposed that democratic support may also function as democratic “demand” (Qi and Shin 2011).
In this view, public support for democracy helps democracy to emerge in addition to (or instead of)
helping it to survive. H3 proposes that support helps propel democratization in autocratic regimes:




With at least ten different cross-national measures in existence (Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton
2010), democracy is perhaps the most-measured concept in social science. The sheer number of
measures indicates the fragmentation of the market, with no single measure of democracy hav-
ing won universal acceptance in the discipline. Indeed, even the three most widely-used mea-
sures – the democracy-autocracy index from Polity IV, the combined Freedom House (FH) index,
and Przeworski and colleagues’ (e.g., Przeworski and Limongi 1997) dichotomous Democracy-
Dictatorship (DD) indicator – have been subject to trenchant criticisms.
In particular, the minimalist Polity and DD measures have been criticized for neglecting the
extent to which participation in the political process is widespread (Munck and Verkuilen 2002;
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Teorell et al. 2018), an important feature of democracy. Although the dichotomous nature of
the DD indicator affords a conceptual clarity, Elkins (2000) show that it leads to lower validity
and reliability. Continuous measures suffer from their own problems. Pemstein et al’s (2010)
latent variable model reveals that both the Polity and FH indices suffer from fairly high levels of
measurement error. Both also cluster at extreme values, raising the concern that they are not finely-
grained enough to pick up variation in highly democratic, or highly autocratic countries (Alexander
and Welzel 2011; Teorell et al. 2018). Indeed, as Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton (2010) show, the
Polity index exhibits a pronounced nonlinear relationship with a latent measure of democracy (see
also Figure S1 in the supplementary materials). Criticism has furthermore been directed at the lack
of clarity by which scores are assigned to indicators Munck and Verkuilen (2002), and also the
use of generalists, rather than country specialists, to assign these scores (Pemstein, Meserve, and
Melton 2010).
Without a clear solution to these issues, empirical scholars of democratization have stuck
to using one or two of the big three measures. Fortunately, new measures of democracy provided
by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Lindberg et al. 2014; Teorell et al. 2018; V-Dem
Institute 2018b) allow us to progress beyond this impasse. The advantages of the V-Dem measures
are fourfold.
First, V-Dem derive five conceptualizations of democracy from the extensive political the-
ory literature on this topic: electoral, liberal, participatory, egalitarian, and deliberative democracy
(Lindberg et al. 2014). Other, extant measures of democracy are based far more loosely, if at all,
on extant theoretical conceptualizations.
Second, V-Dem then measures each of these conceptualizations in a more finely-grained
fashion than existing democracy indices. They disaggregate each variety of democracy into its
major sub-components, and measure these using multiple indicators. Ultimately V-Dem’s liberal
democracy index is measured with 69 indicators, compared with the 22 used for the combined
Freedom House index and 4 used for the Democracy-Dictatorship indicator.
Third, V-Dem use country experts to code their indicators, rather than the in-house coders
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used by the Polity and Freedom House projects. Country specialists are well placed to rate various
aspects of democracy in that country with which they are most familiar. Indeed, the Pemstein,
Meserve, and Melton (2010) analysis of ten democracy measures suggests that those relying on
specialists (e.g., the Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney (2005) measures of democracy in Central
America) have lower error variance than those relying on generalists (e.g., Polity and Freedom
House) as well as those using objective data (Vanhanen’s index). In addition, V-Dem gathers inde-
pendent ratings from an average of five different country experts, which reduces the measurement
error considerably (Teorell et al. 2018).
Finally, V-Dem aggregates the indicators into subcomponents and democracy indices in
a principled fashion. Items are combined into subcomponents using Bayesian factor analyses,
which allows a test of whether they actually cohere as theory suggests (V-Dem Institute 2018c).
The democracy indices are then assembled out of subcomponents using either a multiplicative or
additive logic, as demanded by the particular conceptualization of democracy that is of interest.
Given these advantages in conceptualization and measurement, I use V-Dem data to mea-
sure democracy in this article. In particular, I use the V-Dem “liberal democracy index.” This
comprises a polyarchy, or “electoral democracy” index, which measures the political institutions
“making rulers responsive to citizens ... through electoral competition for the electorate’s ap-
proval,” and a liberalism index, which captures the factors “protecting individual and minority
rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority” (V-Dem Institute 2018a,
38).4
Measuring Democratic Support
Democratic support is measured using existing survey data. I collected nationally-aggregated re-
sponses to all the questions gauging public support for democracy that were available at the time
of research. In particular, I selected survey questions focusing on diffuse support for democracy,
4The electoral democracy index is used as a robustness test, in results reported in the online
supplementary materials.
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and gathered by cross-national survey projects fielding representative national samples of citizens.
Relevant questions include those asking respondents to evaluate the appropriateness or desirability
of democracy, to compare democracy to some undemocratic alternative, or to evaluate one of these
undemocratic forms of government.5
The following survey questions – all conceptually distinct from diffuse support for democ-
racy – were excluded: (1) items calling for instrumental appraisals of democracy; (2) questions
tapping respondents’ trust in national political institutions (e.g., parliament); (3) items gauging
support for previous political regimes (e.g., Communism); and (4) questions regarding the extent
to which a country was in fact democratic. I also do not include questions regarding respondents’
satisfaction with the performance of democracy, which is better regarded as a measure of specific
support for democracy (Booth and Seligson 2009; Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001). Instead,
I use satisfaction with democracy to provide a further test of the theory of democratic support.6
Survey measures of support for democracy were available for 14 survey projects, 150 coun-
tries, and as far back in time as 1988.7 The resulting dataset of survey marginals is large in com-
5A list of included survey items is included in the online supplementary materials. Although
these items are widely used to measure democratic support (e.g., Dalton 2004; Klingemann 1999;
Mattes and Bratton 2007; Magalhães 2014; Norris 2011), they are not universally endorsed. Schol-
ars such as Booth and Seligson (2009), Gibson (1996), Rose and Mishler (1996), and Svolik (2018)
have proposed slightly different measures. These, however, have only been measured in a few
countries at a few points in time.
6Similar methods are used to measure panels of satisfaction and support. Details regarding the
former are presented in the online supplementary materials.
7Data are drawn from the following survey projects: the World and European Values Surveys,
the Afrobarometer, Arab Barometer, Latinobarometer, Asiabarometer, Asian Barometer, South
Asia Barometer, New Europe Barometer, Latin American Public Opinion Project, Eurobarometer,
European Social Survey, Pew Global Attitudes Project, and the Comparative Study of Electoral
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parison with existing studies of the theory of democratic support, with 3,765 nationally-aggregated
responses obtained from 1,390 nationally-representative survey samples. It is, however, fractured
across time and space, with gaps in coverage for almost all countries. For example, in South Africa,
cross-national survey projects fielded questions on support for democracy in 11 national surveys:
the World Values Survey in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2013, the Afrobarometer project in 1999, 2003,
2005, 2008, 2012, and 2015, and Pew Global Attitudes in 2002, 2013, and 2017. Despite this fairly
regular polling, measures of South African democratic support are only available for 12 of the 22
years between 1996 and 2017 – and this is a case with above average coverage.
To make matters worse, the data are further fragmented across numerous survey questions.
Indeed, there were as many as 52 different questions in the dataset, depending on how strictly
I distinguished between items.8 Such fractured and unruly data are not easily combined into a
single set of latent measures. Indeed, analysts’ response to this fragmentation has generally been
to discard most of the data and focus only on items collected by one survey project at one point
in time, thus creating a small cross-national dataset (e.g., Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Qi and Shin
2011; Welzel 2007). Unfortunately, not only does this result in the neglect of interesting and useful
temporal variation, it removes the additional information that is provided by other survey projects
and items.
Instead, I use the dynamic Bayesian latent trait model measurement model developed by
Claassen (2019). This model permits the measurement of a “smooth” country-year panel of public
opinion that uses all available survey data, even when these are fragmented across space, time, and
question wording. A brief overview of the model is provided below, with a formal expression –
and further discussion – in the online supplementary materials.
First, the model treats the observed number of respondents offering support for democracy
Systems.
8Two items fielded by different projects were always classed as distinct even if their wording
appeared to be identical. This allows the model’s item bias parameters to capture variation induced
both by question wording and by idiosyncrasies in the methodology of the various survey projects.
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to each survey item as a binomially-distributed realization of a country- and time-varying latent
variable of democratic support. The binomial probability parameter is further given a beta prior to
allow for additional dispersion beyond that due only to sampling error.
Second, regardless of their actual commitment to democracy, respondents tend to agree
more readily with some items than others. For example, the WVS question that asks respondents to
evaluate whether “having a democratic political system” is a good way of governing their country
is known to produce very high levels of agreement (Inglehart 2003; Klingemann 1999). Item bias
parameters are included to adjust for these effects of survey item wording. These are comparable
to intercepts in confirmatory factor analysis or item difficulty parameters in IRT models.
Third, the model also includes item by country bias parameters, which adjust for the varying
effects of survey questions across countries. For example, some scholars have criticized survey
questions that mention “democracy” because this word has slightly different meanings in different
countries (Booth and Seligson 2009). Such items are therefore non-equivalent, which hampers the
ability to make cross-national comparisons (Stegmueller 2011).9
Finally, each country’s latent estimates are allowed to evolve over time. In particular, latent
support for democracy in a particular country and year is treated as a function of the support
estimated in the previous year plus some random noise. This dynamic component smooths opinion
over time and allows the estimation of a particular country’s democratic support even in years for
which no survey data are available.
Bayesian Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation is used to fit the model.10 The
result is a smooth country-by-year panel of democratic support estimates. Although data are avail-
9Item by country parameters can be estimated along with item bias parameters and time-varying
country latent estimates because the included survey items are generally fielded multiple times in
any given country.
10Further details on priors, software, tests of convergence, and model checks are provided in the
online supplementary materials.
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able for 150 countries and 30 years, the coverage of this panel is limited as follows. First, support
is estimated only for the 137 countries in which at least two separate years of survey data were
available. Second, estimates were removed for years prior to the year in which the first public
opinion survey measuring support for democracy was fielded in each country. National time-series
therefore commence the year support for democracy is first measured using a cross-national sur-
vey. Finally, because V-Dem data are not available for countries with populations of less than a
million, Belize and Malta were dropped from the dataset. The result is a panel dataset of 2,435
support and democracy estimates, drawn from 135 countries, each with time-series ranging from
four to 29 years. This dataset will be the focus of the remainder of the paper.
Claassen (2019) validates the latent variable model using held-out data. It proves to be
more accurate than alternative methods, including country and item averages but also Caughey
and Warshaw’s (2015) “Grouped IRT” model. To further bolster confidence in the estimates of
support for democracy, I plot all available estimates for two years, 2005 and 2015 (Figure 1), and
discuss the geographic and temporal variation.11 These choropleths support three conclusions.
First, support is higher where democracy has a long history – Western Europe, North Amer-
ica, and Australasia – and is lower in Asia and North Africa, where the heritage is authoritarian.
This geographic pattern of support is consistent with existing research (e.g., Klingemann 1999;
Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; Norris 2011), which demonstrates the validity of the estimates.
The fact that support is related to previous levels of democracy also confirms the suspicions of
Hadenius and Teorell (2005) and Welzel (2007) that the effect of prior democracy on support
should be considered when one estimates the effect of support on subsequent democratic change.
Second, a comparison of the choropleths reveal that support softened between 2005 and
2015 in some Western bastions of democracy, notably the USA and Canada. This trend is also
consistent with other recent analyses (Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017). Since “signs of deconsolida-
11In the supplementary materials, I provide further discussion of the validity and unidimension-
ality of the latent estimates. I also provide similar plots showing national estimates of satisfaction
with democracy.
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Estimates of democratic support in 2005 and 2015. Quartiles are calculated using data pooled across coun-
tries and years. Darker shades indicate countries with higher levels of support. Countries for which no
estimates are available in the given year are shaded white.
tion” (Foa and Mounk 2017) do seem to be appearing in these countries, it is all the more urgent
to test whether democracy does in fact require public support.
Third, quite the opposite trend is revealed in Africa, particularly in the South, East, and
West: high – and indeed, rising – levels of democratic support in 2015. This pattern is yet another
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that echoes the findings of previous research (e.g., Bratton and Houessou 2014). In addition, it
raises the question of whether higher African levels of democratic support could be a sign of
democratic consolidation. These questions, of the consequences of support for democracy, are
where I turn my attention next.
Empirical Strategy
How might one estimate the effect of support on democracy when both variables are persistent over
time, jointly determined by third variables, both observable and unobservable, and prior levels of
democracy are as likely to affect support as support is to affect democracy? This section explains
how the causal effect of support on subsequent democracy will be identified, the assumptions made
in doing so, and the econometric methods that will be used. It then considers how hypotheses 2
and 3, which focus on the effects of support contingent on the existing level of democracy, will be
tested.
To crystallize the empirical strategy, I use causal graphs (e.g., Morgan and Winship 2015).12
These are used to depict the relationship between democracy (dit) and public support (sit) in a panel
set-up, where both variables vary across countries i and years t (Figure 2). The main hypothesis,
that support exerts a causal effect on subsequent democracy, is indicated using a emboldened arrow.
Identifying the Causal Effect of Support
Graph (a), Figure 2, indicates a simple process by which support and democracy are interrelated
over time and space. As can be seen, I assume that democracy and support are serially correlated,
which is indicated by the arrows linking, e.g., di1 to di2. I also allow democracy to exhibit second-
order serial correlation (e.g., Teorell 2010), as indicated by the direct effect from di1 to di3. I further
assume that there is no contemporaneous effect of support on democracy. A higher level of support,
12I closely follow the example of Imai and Kim (2019), who use graphs to describe the identifi-
cation of causal effects in a panel data context.
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Causal graphs depicting three hypothetical data-generating processes whereby support sit exerts a causal
effect on subsequent democracy dt+1, with zit being an observed, time- and country-varying confounder, and
ui being an unobserved time-invariant confounder. Bold arrows indicate the hypothesized causal effect of
support on democracy; arrows indicate assumed causal effects. Solid circles indicate observed variables;
dashed circles, unobserved.
in other words, takes some time to produce political change – if it ever does. Certainly it seems
implausible that a higher level of support would exert an immediate effect on democracy.13
In addition, democracy likely influences the level of support, quite aside from any effect
that latter might have on the former. I therefore include causal linkages from democracy to support
in graph (a). Informed by the “thermostatic” model of policy opinion dynamics (Wlezien 1995),
I assume that two particular effects are possible: support is influenced by immediate changes in
democracy as much as prior levels of democracy. I indicate these two possible effects through
the use of contemporaneous and lagged linkages between democracy and support. Under the
assumptions of the data-generating process in graph (a), the causal effect of support on democracy
13It is a standard assumption, in empirical studies of democracy, that independent variables exert
effects on subsequent levels of democracy (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2009; Boix 2011; Teorell 2010;
Welzel 2013).
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is given by the effect of sit−1 on dit, provided that one control for the first two lags of democracy
dit−1 and dit−2.
Graph (b) then presents a more complex data-generating process with a third variable z that
confounds the observed relationship between democracy and support. For example, the level of
economic development has been linked with the stabilization and emergence of democracy (Boix
2011; Przeworski and Limongi 1997), as well as the emergence of a democratic political culture
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005). For the reasons outlined earlier, I assume again that there is no
contemporaneous effect of zit on dit, but, rather, this effect is lagged one year. I also assume that zit
influences sit but not the reverse: this third variable is not affected by the level of support in other
words. I furthermore assume no effect of dit on zit, but this could be relaxed without consequence.
Given these assumptions, estimating the causal effect of support on democracy requires adjusting
for the effects of dit−1, dit−2, and zit−1.
The first tests of the effect of support on democracy in this article follow the assumptions
of graph (b). These tests use the following linear model, which include two lags of democracy and
a set of control variables Z:
dit = α + φ1dit−1 + φ2dit−2 + βsit−1 + Z′it−1γ + εit (1)
I include five control variables that plausibly determine both support and democracy. First,
I use the log of GDP per capita to measure economic development, with data drawn from the
World Bank World Development Indicators.14 Second, economic growth – and in particular, eco-
nomic crises – may also raise the risks of regime failure (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Teorell
2010). I therefore calculate annual growth in GDP per capita using the GDP data. Third, de-
pendence on natural resource revenues (Ross 2001) is measured using an indicator for whether a
country received greater than $1,000 per person in revenue from oil, natural gas, and minerals in
14The few missing values were imputed using linear models applied to GDP per capita data from
the IMF and Penn World Tables.
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a given year.15 Fourth, to capture the regional diffusion of democracy (Gleditsch and Ward 2006),
I measure the average level of regional democracy for each year.16 Finally, some scholars have
argued that democracy struggles to emerge in countries with an Islamic tradition, perhaps due to
the political culture (e.g., Fish 2002). Although a time-invariant variable, I also include a measure
of the proportion of a country identifying as Muslim in 1990.17
There is an additional threat to causal inference that remains to be considered: the con-
founding effects of unobservable, country-specific and time-invariant factors, indicated by u in
graph (c) (Figure 2). For example, as discussed earlier, “critical junctures” in national paths of po-
litical development may have influenced the current presence of democracy and the contemporary
nature of the political culture (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2009). Estimating the causal effect of support
on democracy under the assumptions of graph (c) requires adjusting not only for dit−1, dit−2, and
zit−1, but also for ui. When using panel data one can achieve the latter by including country fixed
effects. This yields a dynamic fixed effects model, which is frequently used in empirical studies
of democratization (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 2008; Boix 2011; Haber and Menaldo 2011). I similarly
run additional tests of by adding country fixed effects µi to equation 1:
dit = φ1dit−1 + φ2dit−2 + βsit−1 + Z′it−1γ + µi + εit (2)
However, estimating such dynamic fixed effects models is problematic when time-series
are short – as they are for many of the countries in my sample – because the lagged dependent
15The original data were drawn primarily from the World Bank World Development Indicators,
supplemented with data from Haber and Menaldo (2011). A dichotomous indicator is used to
allow the imputation of missing values within each country’s time series. The revenue data are
also zero-inflated and skewed, which contraindicates a continuous measure.
16I again use V-Dem Liberal Democracy index data with regions defined as United Nations
subregions.
17Data sourced from the Pew Research Center.
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variable coefficient estimates are correlated with the error term εit. This produces a bias (“Nickell
bias”), which grows as T shrinks. A solution is to use a General Methods of Moments (GMM)
estimator. In particular, when the dependent variable is strongly persistent, as it is here, Blundell
and Bond’s (1998) “system GMM” estimator is appropriate. This utilizes further lags of the de-
pendent variable, in both levels and differences, as instruments for the independent variables (see,
e.g., Freeman and Quinn 2012). I utilize the 3rd through 5th lags of democracy (in levels and
differences) as instruments to estimate equation 2. I assume that these lags exert no direct effects
on dit.18
Identifying the Effects of Support on Democratic Survival and Democratic Emergence
I have laid out a strategy for testing the causal effect of support on democracy and the assumptions
made in doing so. However, the 2nd and 3rd hypotheses pertain to the effect of support in promot-
ing the emergence versus survival of democracy, rather than general change in democracy. This
section therefore describes the method with which I will test these differential effects of support on
democracy.
When using a dichotomous measure of democracy, it is straightforward to model the dif-
ferential effects of some determinant of democratization. A typical method is to implement a
dynamic probit model with interactions between lagged democracy and the independent variables
(e.g., Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Gleditsch and Ward 2006).19 The marginal effect of each
interaction term yields the effect of that independent variable in sustaining democracy, while the
main effect gives the effect of that variable in driving a transition from autocracy to democracy.
The situation is more complicated when democracy is conceived and measured continu-
ously, because both the initial level of democracy and the direction of any subsequent change may
vary. In other words, a country that is democratic at time t−1 may become even more so at t, or, in-
18Since I have assumed that the second lag, i.e., dit−2 has a direct effect, it is unsuitable as an
instrument and is therefore not included.
19This is sometimes described as a Markov transition model (e.g., Gleditsch and Ward 2006).
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stead, it may move toward autocracy. And vice versa for an autocracy. To estimate the differential
effects of support in democratic versus autocratic systems, I use a method proposed by Acemoglu
et al. (2009). This requires incorporating a regime type indicator rit, which takes a value of one
if the country is democratic at time t and zero otherwise.20 Equation 1 is adjusted as follows (and
similarly for equation 2, which also includes country fixed effects):
dit = α + φ1dit−1 + φ2dit−2 + βdemsit−1(rit−1) + βautsit−1(1 − rit−1) + Z′it−1γ + εit (3)
The regime-type indicator rit in effect produces two versions of the independent variable,
democratic support. The first where support varies only if the regime is democratic at time t,
otherwise taking a value of zero; the second where support varies only if the regime is autocratic
at time t, otherwise taking a value of zero. There are consequently two parameters capturing the
effects of level of support on democratic change. The first, βdem, gives the effect of support when
the starting point is a democracy; this parameter allows us to test H2. The second, βaut, gives the
effect of support when the starting point is an autocracy, which allows us to test H3.21
Results
Overall Effect of Support on Democracy
I present first the tests of H1, in which the level of democratic support is expected to lead to
democratic change, regardless of the initial level of democracy. Model 1.1 in Table 1 shows the
results of a pooled OLS model corresponding to equation 1, which tests the overall effects of
20I use the “Regimes in the World” indicator from V-Dem, which utilizes the same items as the
liberal democracy index but combines them in a slightly different fashion.
21An alternative method, used by Boix (2011) and Teorell (2010), is to create separate dependent
variables of positive and negative changes in democracy (or upturns and downturns). I report the
results of such models in the online supplementary materials.
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Table 1. Models of Support and Democracy
Dependent variable: Level of democracy
Pooled OLS System GMM
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4)
Democracyt−1 1.141∗ 1.142∗ 1.091∗ 1.095∗
(.080) (.080) (.079) (.083)
Democracyt−2 −.163∗ −.164∗ −.203∗ −.200∗
(.080) (.079) (.051) (.050)
Supportt−1 .264∗ .881∗
(.094) (.366)
Supportt−1, democracies only .318∗ .810∗
(.108) (.344)
Supportt−1, autocracies only .090 .917
(.210) (.672)
Log GDP per capitat−1 .015 .001 .388∗ .366∗
(.123) (.130) (.174) (.186)
GDP per capita growtht−1 .007 .007 −.016 −.014
(.017) (.017) (.020) (.021)
Regional democracyt−1 .008 .008 .055∗ .051
(.005) (.004) (.028) (.030)
Percent Muslim −.002 −.002 −.014 −.013
(.003) (.003) (.009) (.009)
Resource dependencet−1 −.367 −.367 −1.196 −1.128
(.244) (.242) (.683) (.694)
Intercept .647 .765
(.947) (.998)
N observations 2435 2435 2435 2435
N countries 135 135 135 135
N instruments 122 124
Residual standard error 3.056 3.055
Adjusted R2 .986 .985
Wooldridge AR(1) test (p-value) .769 .882
Hansen test (p-value) .438 .469
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p-value) .560 .546
∗p < .05. Pooled OLS models include Beck-Katz panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Standard errors for System GMM models incorporate the Windmeijer correction. Democracy is mea-
sured using the V-Dem Liberal Democracy index and is scaled from 0 to 100. Support is standardized.
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support on subsequent democracy under the assumptions of data-generating process (b) in Figure 2.
These results indicate that support is positively and significantly related to subsequent democratic
change.22
One concern with such a model is possible serial correlation due to the temporal persistence
of democracy. Including two lags of the dependent variable appears to have resolved this problem,
as indicated by the insignificant (p = 0.77) Wooldridge test for serial correlation. A second concern
is cross-sectional correlation across countries and heteroscedasticity within countries (Beck and
Katz 1995). I include Beck-Katz panel-corrected standard errors to adjust for these possibilities.
In addition, as discussed earlier, this model does not take account of unobserved time-
invariant factors which might affect the relationship between support and democracy. Model 1.3,
Table 1 does; it corresponds to equation 2, which focuses only on the within-country effect of
support on democracy. In particular, Model 1.3 is estimated using the system GMM method. As
can be seen, the estimated short-run effect of support on democracy remains positive and significant
in this GMM set up.
GMM models are fairly sensitive to the number of lags used to create instruments. Rood-
man (2009) therefore suggests limiting the number of instruments to no more than the number
of cross-sectional units (countries). I follow this advice by using only the 3rd through 5th lags
of democracy as instruments. A Hansen test (p = 0.44) indicates that the instruments are jointly
valid. An Arellano-Bond test (p = 0.56) shows that there is no second-order serial correlation,
meaning that I do not have to resort to using more distant lags.
The pooled OLS estimate of the short-run effect of support on subsequent democracy is
0.26, with the GMM estimate being somewhat higher (0.88). Since the measure of democracy has
a theoretical scale that ranges from 0 to 100, both effects are fairly small in the short term. Yet the
dynamic nature of both models allows us to estimate both short and long-run effects (De Boef and
Keele 2008). According to Model 1.1, a permanent one-standard-deviation increase in democratic
22Because I have included lagged dependent variables, we can interpret the effect of support as
pertaining to subsequent change in democracy (see, e.g., De Boef and Keele 2008).
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support is expected to lead to an increase in democracy of 12.12 units (95% CI [6.43, 19.63]) in
the long run.23 Despite the larger short run effect of support estimated by the GMM model (Model
1.3), its long-run estimate is lower, at 7.83 (95% CI [4.30, 15.91]).
To demonstrate the long run effects of support on democracy, I plot the simulated effects
of a one standard deviation increase in democracy in Figure 3. Such a plot is not straightforward
when using dynamic models, because the predicted effects at time t feed forward to become lagged
independent variables at time t+1. To do so, I set all independent variables to a moderate value and
allow the system to run for 200 years. I then increase the level of democracy from the mean level
to one standard deviation above the mean, and allow the system of equations to run for a further
30 years. To capture the uncertainty inherent in the model, I use a method of dynamic simulation
outlined by Williams and Whitten (2012).24
The first panel in Figure 3 shows the simulated effects on democracy when support in-
creases by one standard deviation (from 0 to 1), which implies a moderate but not dramatic increase
(the model used is Model 1.1). Following the increase in support, in year 0, democracy increases
slowly but steadily over the ensuing years. After 30 years, democracy is 6.42 units higher, which
23The formula for the long run effect is β/(1−(φ1+φ2)). The estimate and confidence intervals are
generated by simulating 10,000 multivariate normal distributions with expectation being the model
coefficients and the variance being the Beck-Katz panel corrected variance-covariance matrix.
24In particular, I create multiple perturbed vectors of model coefficients by taking 10,000 draws
from a multivariate normal distribution with expectation being the vector of model coefficients and
variance being the Beck-Katz covariance matrix: Θ̃ ∼ MVN(Θ,ΣBK). When predicting effects
using each of the i simulated vectors of k coefficients, I add additional noise as estimated by the
regression standard error: Ỹi ∼ N(XkΘ̃ki, σ). I therefore do not use GMM results, for which
regression standard error estimates are unavailable. Finally, I use the mean value of Ỹi as the point
estimate for that year, and the 0.025 and 0.975 quantiles of Ỹi as the lower and upper confidence
bounds.
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support increases one std. dev. in year 0
Simulated effects are estimated using coefficients from models 1.1 and 1.2. The solid lines indicate the mean
simulated effect; the shaded regions indicate the 95% confidence intervals of these simulated effects.
represents slightly more than half the long-run effect discussed earlier.
This simulation is, of course, extremely hypothetical. Political systems would hardly hold
still for three decades while the effects of an increase in public support feed through the system.
Yet this exercise demonstrates an important point. While changes in democratic support have a
small effect in the short run, this effect accumulates over the long run. Changes in public support
for democracy continue to exert an influence on political regimes for many years.
In sum, I find evidence that support for democracy is positively associated with subsequent
change in democracy. This finding resonates with earlier, cross-sectional research by Inglehart
(2003) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005), but stands in contrast to the null findings of Hadenius and
Teorell (2005) and Welzel (2007). However, this analysis goes substantially further than previous
studies since the evidence is drawn from a much larger sample of countries and years. In particular,
the temporal dimension of the data allows me to both model the dynamic relationships between
support and democracy and adjust for the effects of unobserved country-specific confounders.
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Effects of Support on Democratic Emergence and Survival
The results presented thus far suggest a general relationship between support and democracy. I
now examine more specific processes that might underpin such a general relationship. In other
words, is support linked with democracy by aiding its emergence or its survival? To examine these
more specific processes, I turn to my tests of hypotheses 2 and 3.
Model 1.2 and Model 1.4 (Table 1) follow Acemoglu et al. (2009) in separately estimating
the effects of support within democratic versus autocratic regimes. I again utilize both pooled OLS
and system GMM methods to test these hypotheses. Results from both specifications tell a sim-
ilar story: within democracies, support is positively and significantly associated with subsequent
change in democracy; within autocracies, the effect is insignificant, although still positive. The
GMM results again indicate a stronger short term effect of support than the pooled OLS results. In
sum, the evidence from my data is consistent with H2, but not consistent with H3.
In the second panel of Figure 3, I then display the long run effects of an increase in support
in a hypothetical democratic (black line) and autocratic (grey line) country. Both effects are esti-
mated using Model 1.2. The effect of support is even more pronounced when it is examined within
democracies: after 30 years, the simulated regime is 7.67 units more democratic. For comparison,
the full long run effect, calculated from the results of Model 1.2, is 14.78 (95% CI [7.39, 26.78]).
The effect of support is noticeably weaker in autocracies, with the full long run effect being 4.08
(95% CI [−23.02, 24.41]).
In the online supplementary materials I consider additional model specifications. First, I
include a measure of corruption as an additional time-varying covariate in both the pooled OLS
and system GMM models. Second, I follow Teorell (2010) and Boix (2011) in creating separate
dependent variables of upturns and downturns in democracy. Third, I employ the interactive fixed
effects models proposed by Bai (2009) for unobservable confounds with heterogenous over-time
effects on different countries. Finally, I use a more minimal measure of democracy – V-Dem’s
“electoral democracy index” – as the dependent variable. All these additional models show evi-
dence consistent with H2, i.e., support aids in sustaining democracy. There is no evidence for the
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Table 2. Models of Support, Satisfaction, and Democracy
Dependent variable: Level of democracy
Pooled OLS System GMM
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4)
Supportt−1 .281∗ .697∗
(.103) (.303)
Supportt−1, democracies .294∗ .660∗
(.113) (.293)




Satisfactiont−1, democracies .000 .016
(.096) (.167)
Satisfactiont−1, autocracies −.302 −.187
(.161) (.249)
N observations 2278 2278 2278 2278
N countries 126 126 126 126
N instruments 124 128
Residual standard error 3.077 3.075
Adjusted R2 .985 .985
Wooldridge AR(1) test (p-value) .894 .670
Hansen test (p-value) .563 .593
Arellano-Bond AR(2) test (p-value) .561 .567
∗p < .05. All models include two lags of democracy and the covariates specified in Table 1. Pooled
OLS models include Beck-Katz panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; standard errors for
System GMM models incorporate the Windmeijer correction. Democracy is measured using the V-
Dem Liberal Democracy index and is scaled from 0 to 100. Support and satisfaction are standardized.
democratizing effect of support (H3), and mixed evidence for the overall effect (H1).
In sum, the findings of the analyses suggest that the effect of support is concentrated in sys-
tems that are already democratic. In other words, while support appears to help sustain democracy,
it does not appear to help autocracies democratize.
Effects of Satisfaction on Democracy
Finally, I consider the role played by satisfaction with the performance of democracy. This measure
captures citizens’ evaluations of the performance of the system as a whole as well as the incumbent
government of the time (Booth and Seligson 2009; Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001), and is
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therefore a more instrumental and specific form of support. It may be the case that the favorable
effects of support that we have observed are due to such instrumental approval of performance
rather than any principled commitment to democracy. In this section I therefore test whether
democratic support helps sustain democracy over and above any supportive effects exerted by
democratic satisfaction.
I replicate my models from Table 1, in both the pooled OLS and system GMM specifica-
tions, but now adding satisfaction to the equations. These are presented in Table 2. Satisfaction
does not show a positive and significant effect on subsequent democracy, regardless of whether the
pooled OLS or system GMM model is used, or whether its effects are examined within democra-
cies or autocracies. Support, however, continues to exhibit a significant effect on democracy, and
one that is of similar magnitude to those reported in Table 1.
These results suggest two findings which are consistent with Lipset-Easton theory of demo-
cratic support. First, specific support for democracy exerts little or no independent effect on the
rise or fall of democracy. Second, diffuse support helps sustain democratic regimes, and it does so
quite aside from any specific support that democracy may attract due to instrumental performance
evaluations.
Conclusion
From Latin America to Western Europe, and from Africa to North America, democracy is under
attack from authoritarian and populist leaders. The findings described in this article are consistent
with a classic theory for why this might occur – the support afforded to democracy by the public.
As scholars have long argued, if support is low, emerging democracies might fail to consolidate,
or even descend into autocracy. Moreover, although Western democracies were thought to have
consolidated, and thus escaped this purgatory, the evidence presented here bolsters recent warn-
ings that declining support for democracy might lead to even established democracies failing, or
becoming “deconsolidated” (Foa and Mounk 2016; 2017; Plattner 2017).
However, the findings of this article are not consistent with another hypothesis regarding
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public support for democracy: that it functions also as “demand for democracy,” spurring further
democratization (Qi and Shin 2011). Thus, although public support may help bolster and defend
already-existing democratic rights and institutions, it does not appear to push elites to establish
or expand these rights and institutions. This is perhaps not terribly surprising. While political
competition makes democracies at least somewhat responsive to public opinion – including opinion
about whether the regime should be democratic or not – autocratic elites are arguably less pressured
by popular sentiments. They also are more willing and able to suppress popular demands if need
be.
In order to test the effects of support on democracy I gathered an expansive database of over
3,000 nationally-aggregated opinions, and estimated a smooth country-by-year panel of democratic
support that varies over 135 countries and up to 29 years. This dramatically increased the available
data on support, with variation now over time as well as space. Yet by the standards of, for example,
the literature on development and democracy, these data are still quite limited in geographic and
temporal range. In particular, survey measures of support for democracy began in earnest only after
the third wave of democracy crested in the early 1990s. As a consequence, we cannot ascertain
whether these findings pertain to previous periods of democratic decline, such as the “reverse
wave” seen in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, the literature on development and democracy has
shown that the link between the two has varied considerably over time (e.g., Boix 2011; Acemoglu
et al. 2009).
This article has also been silent on the mechanisms by which public support bolsters democ-
racy and lack of support undermines it. Perhaps low support for democracy allows populist and
undemocratic leaders to emerge (Foa and Mounk 2016; Plattner 2017); in contrast, when such
leaders attempt to undermine democratic procedures, perhaps high support triggers collective ac-
tion by an outraged public (Booth and Seligson 2009). Given the current challenges to democracy,
these are crucial questions for scholars to investigate.
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